Nongovernmental organization (NGO) involvement in development has been increasing in recent years (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Hulme and Edwards 1997 )-partly because of dissatisfaction with government delivery of public services. International NGOs as well as bilateral and multilateral donors have sought to channel more development funding through local NGOs, causing the sector to grow rapidly in developing economies. But it is unclear whether donors, through their funding, encourage a local charitable sector or local NGOs are simply subcontractors for international development agencies.
NGOs in poor countries are presumed to be charitable organizations, that is, operating with an altruistic or a philanthropic purpose shared by their members and promoters. Much of donors' dissatisfaction with governments' public service delivery originates in concerns over corruption. Civil servants running government schools and health centers are assumed to be motivated by selfinterest, explaining why they divert resources from the public Lindelow, Reinikka, and Scensson 2003) . But NGOs are considered less selfish and thus less likely to divert funds-a belief that underlies the switch in donor funding.
Several researchers have doubted that NGO motives in poor countries are first and foremost charitable (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Platteau and Gaspart 2003) . But these doubts are generally based on a few case studies. No one has investigated these issues using a large representative sample of NGOs. Given the growing importance of local NGOs and their potential for delivering services, this gap needs to be filled. This article examines the factors that influence local NGOs' capacity to attract external resources using a nationally representative survey of 300 NGOs in Uganda.
NGOs obtain resources in several ways. Some resources are raised in cash, for example, financial grants, and membership fees; others are raised in kind, for example, volunteer work and complimentary use of equipment and facilities. In Uganda, international grants are by far the major source of funding for domestic NGOs (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2003) . For small NGOs, membership fees and donations are important, suggesting that local NGOs that receive donor funding may be different in some fundamental sense from NGOs that attract voluntary contributions from nationals. To investigate this, the factors that influence local NGOs' capacity to successfully obtain grant funding are examined and contrasted with the determinants of voluntary contributions in cash and in kind.
This issue is first approached from a reduced form perspective to examine whether the ex ante characteristics of NGOs receiving grant funding are the same as those that do not. NGOs receiving external funding differ markedly from those that do not: they are much more likely to be part of an international network and to be managed by an educated, well-connected leader. Grant recipients on average raise fewer resources domestically.
The investigation then turns to whether donor funding displaces voluntary contributions from nationals, that is, whether international funding is a complement or substitute for local charity. Local NGOs may be genuinely altruistic organizations whose effectiveness is enhanced by external funding. Externally funded NGOs would be expected to expand and attract more local resources. Local NGOs may act as subcontractors for international donors, in which case local funding does not matter. Local NGOs may also be altruistic, but external funding may crowd out their willingness to give.
The issue is difficult to investigate, especially given the challenge of collecting data on NGOs. An instrumental variable approach yields evidence that grant recipients raise fewer resources locally, notably from member fees and contributions. This suggests crowding out. But in a similar analysis using NGO-fixed effects, the evidence of crowding out disappears. This suggests that grant recipients are NGOs that are, on average, less likely to receive local contributions.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that grants from external donors do not encourage a local charitable sector. Many local NGOs seem to be created simply to obtain grant funding.
1 This interpretation is reinforced by the numerous Ugandan NGOs that have a shadowy existence when they do not receive an external grant. For instance, of the roughly 1,700 NGOs registered in Kampala at the time of the survey, only a quarter could be located. Grants do not appear to go to NGOs that would raise funds on their own; instead, they go to a few well-educated, well-connected organizations and individuals skilled at writing grant applications.
Observing that grant recipients do not raise local resources does not imply that they deliver services poorly. But it calls into question the assumption that underlies the switch away from government services: if local NGOs are not driven by an altruistic motive, why should they be expected to behave in a less opportunistic manner than civil servants? There may be other reasons why donors prefer private service delivery, such as better control, faster response to emergencies, or the promotion of a specific message or agenda. But based on the evidence presented here, it would be foolish to rely on altruism to economize on monitoring. Donors seem to understand this well. Survey results indicate that NGOs are subject to extensive donor monitoring.
Given the growing number of NGOs in Africa, increased funding from donors, and NGO potential for delivering services to the poor, a thorough analysis of the sector is overdue. Evidence suggests that there has been strong growth of NGOs in the region (Anheier and Salamon 2006; Wallace, Bornstein, and Chapman 2007) . Presumably partly in response to this growth, several African countriesKenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zimbabwe-have recently implemented new NGO monitoring or regulation frameworks. This article is thus pertinent to all African countries seeing NGO growth. A major reason for the limited work to date is a lack of representative data on NGO structures, finances, and activities. Access to such information is extremely difficult to obtain due to government sensitivities. The Ugandan government, however, has been willing to support NGO surveys. Because Uganda is a good example of a growing and dynamic African NGO sector, its insight can help guide policy across the continent.
The article is organized as follows. Section I presents the conceptual framework that underlies the empirical analysis. A simple model is constructed in which a local NGO receives external funding from an altruistic donor. Section II presents the data, which come from a survey of Ugandan NGOs. Section III discusses the empirical analysis. And section IV summarizes the findings and presents some areas for further research.
Most NGO funding in Uganda comes from international donors (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005) , so understanding fundraising by local NGOs requires understanding what motivates international donors to channel development assistance through local NGOs.
Altruism, Crowding Out, and Efficiency
Donors may wish to avoid channeling all their assistance through government agencies for several reasons, including corruption, instability, and ideological and political differences. To bypass the government, donors can use private (for-profit) subcontractors or local not-for-profit NGOs. In Uganda, the number of local NGOs has skyrocketed to 20 times as many registered NGOs as registered firms. Many registered NGOs exist only on paper, but this nevertheless suggests that donors prefer to channel funds through local NGOs than through private firms.
2 The question is why. One possible reason is local NGOs have more expertise in delivering the services that interest donors. Although this is important in some cases and needs to be controlled for, according to Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2005) , local NGOs in Uganda are often young, and most adopt a holistic approach, without any strong specialization by activity or region.
Another possible reason is that channeling funds through not-for-profit organizations prevents misappropriation of development funding. Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2005) cast serious doubt on this premise as well. NGOs in Uganda do not file a tax return and are subject to little or no government scrutiny regarding profit distribution. Donors monitor grant recipients, but they could just as easily monitor for-profit subcontractors. It is thus unclear whether channeling funds through NGOs provides any advantage in this respect.
This leaves one important possibility: local NGOs are altruistically motivated and thus less subject to moral hazard. An NGO that cares about the welfare of the beneficiaries of development assistance is less likely to divert funds. Furthermore, local NGOs may provide a cheaper service because they can access a workforce, equipment, and buildings at less than market price. Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2005) , for instance, have shown that many local NGOs in Uganda employ volunteers and use buildings and equipment on a complimentary basis. They also raise local funding in the form of membership fees and local donations.
Channeling development assistance through charitable organizations is subject to another incentive problem, dubbed "crowding out" in the literature. Crowding out occurs when outside funding reduces local charitable contributions. For instance, suppose that each $ of outside funding reduces local contributions by d$, with d , 1. This means that each $ of outside funding 2. Many registered NGOs have no actual existence and were created to attract donor funding that never materialized. But if donors had sought instead to channel funds through registered for-profit firms, the same behavioral process of wishful creation would instead have increased the number of registered firms. This did not happen, suggesting that donors have targeted NGOs-or at least are consistently perceived to have.
generates (1 2 d)$ of additional spending on beneficiaries. Although the mechanism is different, crowding out is similar to fund diversion because it is an implicit tax on development assistance.
The two sources of funds are easily embedded within the same stylized model. Consider an altruistic organization, hereafter called the NGO. 3 This organization is made up of members and promoters who serve a target beneficiary. Beneficiary welfare is denoted by V(t, z), where t is the cost to the NGO of the service provided to beneficiaries and z is an exogenous NGO characteristic that denotes how competent the NGO is in serving the beneficiary group.
It is assumed that @V/@t . 0, @V/@z . 0, and @V 2 /@t@z . 0. The first two assumptions mean that the welfare gain to beneficiaries increases with the size of the transfer and with NGO competence. The third assumption means that more competent NGOs are more productive, that is, an incremental transfer t generates a higher increase in beneficiary welfare when NGO competence z is higher.
The NGO starts with a stock of resources T, which for now is taken as given. This stock includes the financial resources of members and promoters as well as the value of their time. The NGO must decide how much of T to allocate to the beneficiary target group. The remaining is consumed by the organization (that is, by members and promoters).
The decision problem facing the NGO can be written: 4 max t Vðt; zÞ þ vUðT À tÞ subject to t T;
3. In this model, altruism and joy of giving are basically equivalent, so the distinction between them is not emphasized here. For a discussion, see Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) and the references cited therein.
4. NGOs may also raise local private funds in addition to donor grants. The literature on charitable contributions has typically couched the discussion of crowding out in terms of public versus private outside funds (Ribar and Wilhelm 2002; Andreoni and Payne 2003) . This is due largely to the literature's focus on developed countries, where charitable contributions from the general public are common. A distinction has been drawn between altruism-that is, concern for the utility of the beneficiary population-and joy-of-giving-which does not depend on beneficiary welfare. Free riding among altruistic benefactors reduces voluntary contributions as the number of benefactors increases. Ribar and Wilhelm (2003) show that when altruism is the sole reason for giving, for many functional forms and parameter values public funds crowd out private contributions one for one-that is, one additional dollar of public money reduces private contributions by one dollar. In this model free riding does not arise because, by construction, there is a single contributor. With multiple private contributors, free riding is another source of crowding out, in which case the distinction between altruism and joy-ofgiving becomes relevant. Here vU(T2t) can be regarded as a reduced form summarizing the equilibrium of the private contribution game. The model can also allow for active fundraising by the NGO. Modeling this in detail would take too much space, so only a few essential observations are included here. Imagine that the NGO has a ( probabilistic) production function for obtaining grants and private funds. Fundraising takes time and effort from NGO promoters, thereby subtracting from t. When the NGO has no grant, the opportunity cost of promoter time is low, and the NGO devotes more effort to raising private funds. When the where v is a welfare weight measuring how much the NGO cares about the welfare of its promoters. 5 Let t(T, z, v) denote the NGO decision on the amount of transfer it makes to target beneficiaries. It is easy to show (see Proposition 1 in Appendix) that organizations with more resources (higher T) or more altruism (lower v) give more, that is, have a higher t, while more competent organizations (higher z) give less.
Whether there is crowding out depends on the sign of @V 2 /@t 2 . If @V 2 /@t 2 , 0, the amount given t increases less than proportionally with NGO resources T(see Proposition 2 in Appendix). There is crowding out: adding external funding G to NGO resources Ttranslates into additional transfers of less than G to beneficiaries. It is natural to assume @V 2 /@t 2 , 0 whenever the marginal welfare gain falls with t, perhaps because of satiation or because of increasing marginal costs in the production of services.
In contrast, if @V 2 /@t 2 . 0, external funding has a multiplier effect, that is, dt/dT . 1. This will be the case if there are threshold effects in consumptionfor instance, because the utility of beneficiaries rises faster than cost over a certain range-or if there are increasing returns in service delivery-for instance, because setup costs are fixed. When this happens, NGO members and promoters respond to external funding by volunteering more of their own resources, because they are more productive in achieving their altruistic goal.
To summarize, whether transfers to beneficiaries increase more or less than proportionally with external resources depends on the sign of @ 2 V/@t 2 and, hence, on whether marginal delivery costs are increasing or decreasing. The model is sufficiently general to encompass situations in which crowding out is so large that part of the external funding G is appropriated by the NGO, that is, when t , G. Since dt/dv , 0, diversion of funds is more likely if the NGO is less altruistic-as would be the case, for instance, if the NGO is actually a for-profit entity.
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The difficulty is identifying NGOs that are competent-so that they can provide the service in a cost-effective manner-but also altruistic enough not to divert external funds for personal consumption. So far it has been assumed that the donor observes the characteristics T, z, and v and effort t of the NGO. In practice, donors are not fully informed about the type and effort of grant applicants.
Donors may seek to observe effort t through monitoring. As Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2005) documented for Uganda, this can be accomplished in a variety of ways, such as reporting requirements, field visits, surveys of benefactors, and audits, that are all costly. Monitoring diverts resources that NGO receives a grant, the opportunity cost of the promoter's time rises, thereby reducing private fundraising effort. This is another source of crowding out. Again, vU(T 2 t) incorporates this effect.
5. It is assumed that U( . ) is increasing and concave-that is, that the marginal utility of consumption falls with consumption or U 00 , 0. 6. Therefore, v can alternatively be seen as measuring how little guilt or shame NGO promoters would feel from diverting outside funds. A dishonest promoter would not mind setting t , G, thereby diverting outside funds toward personal consumption. Altruism and dishonesty are thus two sides of the same coin.
could otherwise be devoted to beneficiaries.
7 It is thus in donors' interest to economize on monitoring.
This can be accomplished by selecting more altruistic grant recipients. But how to do so is unclear because NGOs may portray themselves as more altruistic than they actually are. Donors are thus expected to be conservative in choosing grant recipients and to display a strong preference for NGOs with which they have worked in the past or for individuals with whom they have previously dealt in other NGOs.
Local NGOs may also raise funds from donations or user fees. The incentive issues surrounding these funds are similar to those affecting donor grants. The main difference is that local funders may be better able to observe NGO competence (z) and altruism (v). Contributions from NGO members are ambiguous because they can serve as a payment for service or as a user fee. Without going into the details how user fees are set, revenue from user fees is an increasing function of NGO output t (an NGO that produces nothing receives no user fees). To the extent that a grant enables an NGO to produce more, it also boosts revenue from user fees.
In these data, it is difficult to distinguish between user fees and charitable contributions because user fees are often recorded as membership fees and NGO members are typically beneficiaries (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005) . Without detailed information on the conditionality of membership fees, it is impossible to separate the fee-for-service element from charitable giving. Still, income from membership fees is likely to increase with grant income, thereby generating a multiplier effect that goes in the direction opposite to crowding out.
Testing Strategy
The empirical objective here is to identify the factors that affect NGO capacity to raise internal and external funds and resources. Let internal resources, in cash and in kind, be denoted by C i and external grants be denoted by G i .
There are two steps in the process. First, reduced forms are estimated and C i and G i are regressed on various NGO characteristics Q i that proxy for their competence (z), wealth (T), and level of altruism (v):
If, as they often claim, donors rely on NGO altruism to minimize incentive problems, the same variables would be significant in regressions (2) and (3), that is, factors that make it more likely that an NGO raises internal funds should also explain success in raising external funds.
7. This is true whether the monitoring cost is borne by the donor (field visit) or by the grant recipient (reporting). Cost minimization should allocate monitoring tasks between donor and recipient.
Inference from comparing regressions (2) and (3) relies on the absence of omitted variable bias. It is conceivable, for instance, that NGOs specializing in different activities may be forced to seek different sources of funding. If local donors are unwilling to fund certain activities, NGOs may have to turn to external donors. If factors affecting the choice of activity are correlated with characteristics Q, this may confound inference. Potentially, a serious concern in other settings, it is unlikely to be a serious source of bias for Uganda. The overwhelming majority of surveyed NGOs remain unspecialized, adopting a holistic approach to development (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005) . So if local funds for certain types of activities were limited, most surveyed NGOs could find an activity that fits local interests. In fact, this is precisely what most do with respect to international donors: the choice of activity is thus best conceived as driven by the availability of funds, not driving it.
Even if NGOs are not altruistic, it may still make economic sense for donors to prefer them over for-profit subcontractors. This point was initially made by Hausman (1980) , who argues that in markets where the quantity or quality of service cannot be verified, organizations that cannot distribute profits provide a more trustworthy alternative. If external donors regard NGOs as subcontractors and do not expect NGO promoters to contribute or to raise private funds locally, only their competence matters; their wealth and altruism are irrelevant. In this case, variables measuring wealth and altruism would not be significant in the external resource regression (3), though they might be significant in the internal resource regression (2).
Second, the extent of crowding out is tested. To this effect, t(T þ G, z, v) 2 G for grant recipients is compared with t(T, z, v) for nonrecipients. Following Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) and Andreoni and Payne (2003) , voluntary contributions C i to NGO i by members and promoters are regressed on whether the NGO is a grant recipient G i and on a set of control variables Q i :
Finding g 1 , 0 is prima facie evidence of crowding out. One difficulty with this approach is the possibility of endogeneity bias; NGOs that were unsuccessful in raising grant funding may put more effort into generating local and internal resources to keep the organization going. To correct this possibility, G i is instrumented using variables that affect grant allocation but not crowding out, such as the factors that affect the probability of receiving a grant independent of beneficiary considerations. One such factor is how connected the NGO is. Because of asymmetric information, NGOs may be more likely to receive grants from donors who are closer to them socially or contractually. Variables proxying for this are used to instrument access to grants.
Another possible source of bias in regression (4) is unobserved heterogeneity. To see how this can affect inference crowding out, suppose that donors are attracted to NGOs that are less involved in raising internal or local funds. This could be because such NGOs devote more attention to courting international donors and are more receptive to their needs. In this case, there would be a negative relationship between C i and G i in regression (4), even after instrumenting. But this relationship would be due to reverse selection by donors. To investigate this possibility, an NGO fixed effect version of regression (4) is estimated:
taking advantage of the fact that each NGO was asked to provide income statements for two consecutive years. This is equivalent to testing whether increased grant income G it from 1 year to the next is associated with reduced internal funds C it . Control variables Q i drop out of the regression because they are time invariant; their effect is captured by the fixed effect u i .
Regressions (2-5) are complementary. Suppose that regressions (2) and (3) show that altruism affects local fundraising, but not success in grant application. And suppose that ĝ 1 , 0 but û 1 ¼ 0. This implies that there is no crowding out at the level of the individual NGO; receiving a grant does not reduce local contributions. But since ĝ 1 , 0, it also implies that donors allocate grants to NGOs that average fewer local contributions and are not particularly altruistic. Over time, this can have dramatic implications for the structure of the NGO sector because donor behavior affects NGO entry. If having a charitable purpose and collecting local contributions are not a prerequisite for obtaining a grant, new NGOs will not be particularly altruistic and will not seek local funds. The NGO sector will be reduced to a mere extension of development assistance.
I I . T H E D A T A
In 2002, Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens undertook the first nationally representative survey of NGOs in Uganda. The survey, initially proposed by a group of Ugandan NGOs, was organized by the World Bank in collaboration with the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda, with funding provided by the Japanese government and the World Bank. The survey was conducted by the Center for the Study of African Economies of Oxford University in collaboration with International Development Consultants in Kampala.
The survey collected information on each NGO's activities, its sources of funding, and its personnel, including characteristics of its leader. A two-step sample selection process was used. The first step identified districts for data collection. The capital Kampala was included because of its importance as a base for many NGOs. In addition, 14 of the country's 56 remaining districts were randomly selected.
8 A random sample of NGOs was then selected-100 from Kampala and 200 from the 14 other districts. 9 For sampling purposes, an NGO belonged to the district in which its headquarters were located.
To draw a random sample of NGOs, a list of all active NGOs in the selected districts was constructed using the records of the NGO Registration Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 10 As of December 2000, approximately 3,500 NGOs were registered, though not all were operational, so the registers for the selected districts were updated and verified before sampling.
11 A sample of 100 NGOs was then drawn randomly from the 451 Kampala-based NGOs that could be verified. For the other districts, a self-weighting sample of 200 NGOs was randomly selected from the verified list. The combined stratified sample (Kampala plus districts) roughly represents the national situation. Further details on the sampling procedure can be found in Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
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The authors then cleaned the data. Given the heterogeneity of the dataset, two outliers were identified: one is an NGO much older than others and another is a large international NGO with much more abundant resources. Excluding these outliers does not noticably alter the results.
I I I . E M P I R I C A L A N A L Y S I S
The empirical analysis consists of three parts: univariate analysis, reduced form regressions, and testing for crowding out.
Univariate Analysis
Based on the data, C i is constructed as a measure of financial contributions to the NGO from members through fees and donations. This information is available only for a subsample of the dataset (199 respondents) that agreed to provide financial accounts. But data on the number of full-time paid and 8. The 14 selected districts were Arua, Busia, Iganga, Jinja, Kabale, Kassese, Kibaale, Lira, Luwero, Mbale, Mbarara, Mukono, Rakai, and Wakiso. One district (Gulu) that was initially included in the list was subsequently replaced because of the lack of security in the region.
9. The overall sampling proportion required to yield a sample of 200 was calculated by dividing the proposed sample size by the number of NGOs in all the districts during the exercise. This sampling proportion was then multiplied by the number of NGOs in each district to yield a self-weighting sample.
10. The registry does not include the Catholic Church, the Church of Uganda (Anglican), and the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, three organizations that have been operating in the country for many years. These organizations are thus omitted from the survey in spite of their large size.
11. See Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2005) for a detailed discussion of the results of this verification exercise.
12. A detailed questionnaire was designed and pretested in Uganda by the authors. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews between enumerators and an NGO representative-usually the leader of the NGO. The enumerators and their supervisors received a week of training on the questionnaire and on interviewing techniques before the survey began. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
voluntary staff during last 12 months and whether the NGO has complimentary use of equipment or vehicles are available for the full sample. Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2005) have shown that these are important resources, especially for nongrant recipients.
For G i , two measures are used: the value of grant funding received in the last fiscal year (in Ugandan shillings) and a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the NGO received a grant in the 12 months before the survey. Information on funding is available only for the respondents that provided financial data. The qualifications and experience of the NGO leader are used as measures of NGO competence z. Qualification variables include age, education, and work experience. Because the NGO leader is nearly always its promoter, the wealth and parental background of the NGO leader and whether the leader has a relative living abroad are used as control variables for wealth T. The wealth of the NGO leader cannot be used directly because it may be subject to reverse causation due to crowding out or fund diversion.
Altruism v is proxied by a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the NGO has a religious affiliation. Many international donors, being secular organizations, are reluctant to facilitate religious proselytizing by funding churches' social activities. It is, however, reasonable to expect religious organizations to be more altruistic, at least toward their followers. This is indeed what the evidence suggests. At the time of the Uganda NGO survey, focus group interviews conducted in the communities that NGOs serve showed that when the NGO leader has a religious title, the NGO is more likely to be perceived as altruistic (Barr and Fafchamps 2006) . When donors care a lot about being perceived as altruistic, they may overcome their secular leanings and choose to operate through religious organizations. This is the approach taken by Reinikka and Svensson (2003) , who use religion as a proxy for altruism in their examination of a micro-level dataset on primary health care facilities in Uganda. They find that "working for God" matters: workers and leaders of religious not-for-profit health care facilities have intrinsic motivations to serve poor people. This seems to be the case in Uganda's NGO sector as well. Religious NGOs in Uganda are expected to be more altruistic, and religious NGOs are thus expected to be more successful at raising charitable funds locally.
A dummy variable for having a female NGO leader is included to capture various confounding effects associated with gender, including the possibility that female leaders are more altruistic. To proxy for favoritism, dummy variables are used to indicate whether the local NGO is a subsidiary of the donor and whether the NGO is a member of a Ugandan NGO network. Finally, several variables on previous and current work experience are included as additional measures of competence and to indicate how connected the NGO leader is. Presumably, NGOs that are better connected have a better chance of securing grant funding. difference between grant recipients and nonrecipients is also reported: NGO leaders are more likely to have a substantially higher level of education, to have more work experience, to have previously worked for the government, and to have other current employment with an NGO. They are less likely to have any other current employment. Grant recipients are also older, more likely to be a subsidiary of a foreign NGO, and more likely to belong to a Ugandan NGO network. These findings suggest that personal contacts matter. NGO leaders that receive grants tend to be better connected. The experience and qualifications of the NGO and its leader also matter, suggesting that grant funding goes to more competent NGOs. In contrast, the wealth and parental background of the NGO leader do not show a systematic relationship with grant recipient status. This is the first evidence that donors regard local NGOs more as subcontractors than as altruistic partners.
Grant recipients are less likely to raise voluntary contributions from members and local private donors (the difference is not large but is statistically significant). This is because most Ugandan NGOs raise some contributions from members. In aggregate, grants account for about 80 percent of total NGO funding in Uganda, whereas internal and local funding from private contributors accounts for less than 3 percent. 13 But NGOs differ widely in the proportion of their funding that comes from local private hands because most grant funding goes to only a few NGOs; the majority of Ugandan NGOs receive small grants or none at all. Section I hinted that if donors rely on NGO altruism, they should monitor them less. It follows that donors should use evidence of altruism, such as voluntary contributions by members and promoters, to decide how closely to monitor grant recipients.
To investigate this idea, the analysis turns to whether donors are more likely to monitor NGOs for which voluntary contributions C i are zero. To this effect, NGOs required to supply monthly and half-yearly financial accounts are examined. Two groups of grant recipients are compared: those that receive only a grant and no voluntary contributions and those that receive both. Recipients that receive both are less likely to have to report financial accounts. The difference is significant at the 1 percent level for monthly reports and at the 10 percent level for half-yearly reports. This suggests that, consistent with model predictions, NGOs that depend on grant funding have more stringent monitoring requirements.
Reduced Form Regressions
Inference based on univariate comparisons can be misleading because explanatory variables often interact with each other. This section turns to multivariate analysis, estimating reduced forms of regressions (2) and (3). First, the 13. The remaining 17 percent is from business income. determinants of success in obtaining a grant with only characteristics related to the NGO, excluding the characteristics of the NGO leader, are considered.
The first column of table 2 shows estimates from a probit and confirm several of the univariate findings: the likelihood of receiving a grant increases with the age of the NGO, when the NGO is a subsidiary of a foreign NGO and when the NGO belongs to a Ugandan network of NGOs. While the first finding may be indicative of NGO experience, the other two probably capture the role of personal contacts in accessing grant funding. These findings suggest that donors have difficulties identifying NGOs they can trust and thus rely on networks to screen grant recipients. As section I points out, this would result in repeated interaction to economize on screening and monitoring. This is indeed what the data suggest: of 161 surveyed NGOs that reported having ever received a grant, only 9 had never received one before. The NGO age effect is nonlinear, peaking at around 3 years of experience and falling thereafter. A significantly positive age coefficient emerges when the squared age term is dropped. A religious affiliation has a negative but not significant effect. Other variables, such as whether the NGO targets the poor or is based in the capital city Kampala, have no significant effect. Results are robust to the exclusion of outliers.
14 Next, NGO leader characteristics are included. The results in the second column of table 2 suggest that grant attribution is driven mostly by acquaintance, with no evidence that competence matters. The age and education of the leader are not significant and experience ( proxied by length of tenure in the surveyed NGO and by previous experience in another NGO) has a negative influence on the likelihood of obtaining a grant. NGOs whose leader works at another NGO have a higher likelihood of obtaining a grant, a finding consistent with the idea that contacts play a role in obtaining grants. As predicted by the model, wealth indicators have a negative effect: NGOs whose leaders had wealthy parents and who have a regular job elsewhere are less likely to have obtained a grant.
The fourth column of table 2 shows similar results using grant revenue as the dependent variable, though grant revenue is available for only two-thirds of the respondents. The estimation uses the log(grant revenue þ 1) to avoid losing zero observations and a tobit estimator is used to account for censoring. Results are by and large similar to those of column 2. The main difference is that being based in Kampala raises grant income, suggesting that NGOs based in the capital tend to receive larger grants. The only other variable that remains significant is current employment with another NGO. NGOs whose leader is employed by another NGO also seem to receive more grant funding. Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data from Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
Fafchamps and Owens
These results are then compared with those NGOs raising internal and local resources. Three indicators of local and internal funding are considered: revenue from fees and donations, proportion of full-time workers who are volunteers, and whether the NGO receives complimentary use of equipment or vehicles from other sources. The first captures the main sources of internal and local finance, which is quite small in terms of aggregate funding. The other two capture in-kind resources. Volunteers account for 54 percent of full-time workers and 71 percent of part-time workers in the sector as a whole, so the contribution is non-negligible. A quarter of all NGOs use vehicles belonging to others and a quarter have complimentary use of equipment (such as computers) that does not belong to them.
The same reduced form regressions are estimated for all three indicators, with and without NGO leader characteristics. Table 3 shows that the factors influencing internal and local resources are quite different from those influencing grant funding. Being a subsidiary of a foreign NGO has a negative effect on local funding and volunteers, contrary to grant funding, which has a positive effect. NGO age has a large negative effect on volunteers and complimentary use of equipment, suggesting that these are temporary palliatives used by young NGOs, not permanent ways of funding operations. Religious NGOs and NGOs that target the poor use fewer volunteers, a finding that is hard to reconcile with the idea of an altruistic motive for volunteering but that is consistent with volunteering being a way of jump-starting an NGO before it receives a grant.
NGO leader characteristics also have a very different effect on local resources. Longer tenure at the current NGO is associated with more revenue from fees and donations, suggesting that experience is important in raising funds locally. Having an outside job has a positive effect on volunteering and complimentary use of equipment, two findings that are again consistent with efforts to jump-start an NGO with limited resources.
This reduced form analysis suggests that the factors associated with success in attracting grant funding are quite different from those associated with raising resources internally or locally. Grant funding seems to be influenced largely by network effects-being a subsidiary of an international NGO, belonging to an NGO network, or having a leader who works for another NGO. Volunteers and complimentary equipment, in contrast, seem to be resources that young NGOs mobilize to jump-start operations, perhaps in the hope of obtaining grant funding later. Only fees and donations from local private sources depend on NGO leader experience.
Testing for Crowding Out
Next the analysis estimates regression (4) to determine whether NGOs that receive grants generate fewer voluntary donations of time and money. As in table 3, the dependent variables are revenues from fees and donations, proportion of full-time workers who are volunteers, and a dummy variable for Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data from Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
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complimentary use of equipment and vehicles. The grant variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the NGO has ever received a grant. The dependent variables are first regressed on a grant-funding dummy variable and a series of control variables. These control variables include the same NGO characteristics as in table 3 as well as a series of NGO leader characteristics. Table 4 shows a negative conditional correlation between grants and all three categories of voluntary contributions. The grant variable is significant in the fees and donations regression and nearly significant at the 10 percent level in the volunteers regression.
To address the endogeneity of the grant variable, variables are needed that predict grant funding but are conditionally uncorrelated with receiving local donations and resources. Without a controlled or quasi-experiment there are no truly exogenous instruments, so suitable instruments must be found in the data.
The previous section showed that variables that proxy for how socially connected the NGO leader is may serve as instruments since they predict receiving grants but not raising local contributions. The following variables are thus used as instruments: the length of time the leader has been with the NGO, whether the leader previously worked for the government, whether the leader has other employment, and whether the leader has a relative living abroad. These variables may help the NGO obtain the necessary contacts with international donors, but once NGO characteristics are controlled for, they do not appear to help the NGO raise local private funds. But the possibility that they do cannot be rejected a priori. Results should thus be interpreted with a grain of salt, given the dearth of evidence. The instrumenting regression is shown in table 5 . 15 The instruments are jointly significant, but the F-statistic is less than 10, which indicates a weak instrument problem. Table 6 shows instrumented regression results for voluntary contributions in cash and in kind. An instrumental variable tobit is estimated for fees and donations, an instrumental variable linear regression for share of volunteers, and an instrumental variable probit for complimentary use of equipment and vehicles. The growing literature on coping with weak instruments recommends using corrected confidence intervals. Since the instruments in the regressions are weak, the estimated p-value from a corrected likelihood ratio test proposed by Moreira (2001) Note: Due to space constraints, only the first instrumenting regression is included. The results for the other two are nearly identical, differing only because of sample size and estimation method.
Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data from Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
regression, which is linear, and they are not rejected: the Sargan x 2 statistic has a value of 3.92 and a p-value of 0.271. Admittedly, in the absence of truly exogenous instruments these test results offer only partial reassurance.
Instrumented regression results confirm that grants are negatively correlated with higher local resources: the instrumented grant variable has a negative sign in all three regressions. The effect is large for fees and donations and significant at the 5 percent level for all three dependent variables. Similar results are obtained if NGO leader characteristics are omitted.
18 Despite the difficulty of obtaining the information required for such a test and the absence of Note: Due to space constraints, the instrumenting regression is shown for fees and donations only. The results for the other two instrumenting regressions are nearly identical, differing only slightly because of sample size and estimation method.
18. Because revenue from fees and donations is reported only for a subset of respondents, reporting bias is addressed using a Heckman selection model. Results are not reported here to save space. The key finding is that when selection is controled for, the grant variable remains negative and significant. The selection equation also suggests that selectivity bias is not an issue. Moreira (2001) and implemented in Stata using condivreg. Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data from Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
rigorous evidence on this issue in developing economies, these results provide valuable-if impressionistic-information. The findings reported in tables 4 and 6 are consistent with crowding out: NGOs that obtain grant funding appear to raise fewer resources locally. But the findings may be misleading because they do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. To investigate this possibility, NGO fixed effects are introduced. Respondents were asked to provide retrospective income data for 2000 and 2001. Regression (4) can be estimated, and the hypothesis that NGOs receive fewer fees and donations from private sources after receiving a grant to be tested. Table 7 shows the results from an NGO fixed effect regression of revenue from fees and donations on grant revenue. Increased grant revenue is associated with increased income from fees but not with increased donations. The total net effect on contributions from private sources is not significant. It therefore appears that once unobserved heterogeneity among NGOs is accounted for, the evidence of crowding out disappears.
The contradiction between the two sets of results suggests that the evidence of crowding out in tables 4 and 6 is due in fact to a selection effect: NGOs that are on average more successful at obtaining grants from international donors are significantly less likely to raise local resources. But once an NGO receives a grant, there is no evidence that it reduces internal funding. If anything, the income it generates from membership fees increases. This is probably because grant revenue enables the NGO to offer more services to members, and in exchange it receives more user fees. This interpretation is reinforced by the observation that most NGOs offer services to their members (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005) . At the same time, income from donations-probably a concept closer to altruistic contributions-does not fall with grant income, suggesting that crowding out is not present at the individual NGO level.
Alternative explanations for a negative correlation between grants and local funding are possible without necessarily blaming NGOs' lack of altruism. One is that some NGOs work on a task or issue for which the possibility of raising local funds is limited, for example, certain types of advocacy work (for the Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data from Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) .
environment, women, and the like). To pursue a specific agenda, these NGOs must rely on grant funding. Although this phenomenon may arise in some countries, it is unlikely to account for the pattern observed in Uganda. The overwhelming majority of NGOs surveyed remain unspecialized, adopting a holistic approach to development (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005) . So if local funds for certain types of activities were limited, the overwhelming majority of NGOs surveyed could find in their large portfolio of self-professed interests an activity that suits local benefactors. In fact, this is precisely what most NGO do with respect to international donors. Another possibility is that NGOs reduce local fundraising from user fees to increase beneficiary demand for their services. This could generate a negative relationship between grant funding and income from user fees. As in table 6, the opposite occurs: grant recipients collect more user fees, presumably because grant income enables them to undertake activities for which user fees can be collected.
To summarize, the analysis here suggests that the NGOs that seek grants and are good at obtaining them differ from those that are less successful at securing grants. It seems as though international donors do not seek out the most altruistic and charity-minded NGOs when allocating grants. Combined with the earlier results that proxies for altruism are not correlated with securing grants, donors may indeed see local NGOs more as subcontractors than as local charitable organizations to be encouraged by outside assistance.
I V. C O N C L U S I O N
This article examines the determinants of internal and external funding for NGOs in Uganda. Statistically, the results are not very strong: the sample size is small, and the data show a lot of measurement error, making inference difficult. A controlled or quasi-experiment cannot be used to address causal inference issues in a completely convincing way. Despite these shortcomings, the results provide valuable, even if tentative, evidence on a topic characterized by an abundance of unsubstantiated claims and a dearth of hard evidence.
Success in securing grant funding depends primarily on networking, for example, whether the NGO is member of an NGO network or umbrella organization, whether it is a subsidiary of a foreign NGO, and whether the NGO leader works at another NGO. This may be because donors find it difficult to screen local NGOs and so tend to rely on networks to access relevant information. NGO experience matters, but peaks after only 3 years. Variables proxying for NGO leader competence are not significant, and leader experience and wealth reduce the likelihood of obtaining a grant. Donors more closely monitor NGOs that raise no local resources and tend to provide grants repeatedly to the same NGOs.
Different factors are associated with raising local resources, either through volunteers, member fees and donations, or complimentary use of vehicles and equipment. Very young organizations, often led by someone with regular employment elsewhere, seem to resort to volunteers and complimentary equipment. Leader experience appears to matter only in raising funds from fees and local donations.
A cross-section analysis yields evidence of crowding out: Ugandan NGOs that receive grants raise fewer resources locally. But the same analysis with NGO fixed effects causes the evidence of crowding out to disappear. Instead, income from member fees increases when an NGO receives more grant funding. Donations from members, in contrast, remain unchanged. This suggests that grant recipients do not reduce local funding after receiving a grant. The evidence of crowding out from cross-section regressions is probably due to a selection effect: donors select NGOs that are on average less involved in raising local resources, which would happen if donors regard NGOs as (forprofit) subcontractors of their development efforts. These findings contradict the reason often given to justify channeling development funds through NGOs, namely that they are more altruistic than government agencies and thus are less likely to divert development funds for personal gain.
There may be reasons besides altruism for channeling development assistance through NGOs rather than government agencies. For instance, NGOs may have a lower cost of service delivery, donors may have a better control over spending and activities, or donors may seek to further a philosophical or ideological objective that they could not pursue through secular government agencies.
In Uganda, most NGOs are extremely small and unspecialized (Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens 2005) . It is thus unlikely that they offer a lower cost of delivery since they cannot capture returns to scale and to specialization.
19 But because they are more flexible and can be activated more quickly than government services, NGOs may be well suited for relief operations and for small, localized, or unconventional interventions. This is consistent with Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) , who report that Ugandan NGOs focus on light interventions rather than on the long-term delivery of curative health and fulltime education. Tighter financial control over development assistance may also explain why donors prefer NGOs. Barr, Fafchamps, and Owens (2003) have shown that Ugandan NGOs are subject to numerous forms of monitoring by grant agencies. These issues deserve further investigation. assistance and comments. They are also very grateful to Abigail Barr for her very valuable comments and assistance in data collection, cleaning, and preparation. The support of the U.K. Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully acknowledged; this work is part of the program of the Council's Global Poverty Research Group. F U N D I N G Funding this research was given by the World Bank and the Japanese government.
A P P E N D I X Proposition 1. Organizations with more resources (higher T) or more altruism (lower v) give more-have a higher t-while more competent organizations (higher z) give less.
